

~~SECRET~~  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~SECRET~~

ILLUSTRATIVE DIFFERENCES OF APPROACH IN SPECIFIC INQUIRIES

It is argued in paragraph 6.c. that it is impossible to define a subject matter which can properly be entitled "communism" in such a way that it covers a set of phenomena or institutions which can be separated for study from the subject matter of all other political and social intelligence but that it is possible to distinguish between two different approaches which may be employed in the study of the same set of phenomena. These differences of approach would appear in the questions asked about any particular institution, situation, or development by, on the one hand, the student of "communism" and on the other hand, the student of the political, social and economic life of a country. The following sets of questions are designed to illustrate the difference of approach to a number of hypothetical subjects. Each heading might be the title of an intelligence collection and research project. Under each title two sets of questions are suggested, first those that might be asked by the specialist in the country, and second, those that might be asked by the student of "communism".

1. TUDEH PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES AND PARTY INSTRUCTIONS

From the standpoint of Iran: The project is relevant because of the implications for the internal political situation of whatever is done concerning the Tudeh Party's propaganda activities and instructions to party organizers. Specifically, the analyst is interested in the power position of the present government, the capabilities of the government to keep the communists in check, the ability of the Tudeh Party to subvert the bureaucracy and the armed forces, and the degree of significance of Tudeh penetration into labor organizations, especially as this affects the newly reopened oil industry.

~~SECRET~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

From the standpoint of Communism: The evidence is interesting mainly for the light it throws on the tactics recommended. The analyst would probably draw a comparison between these tactics and those used by communist parties in neighboring areas. He would seek an indication of whether the U.S.S.R. intends to employ pressure on Iran and what degree of pressure, an indication of the present strength and status of the party, and a possible forecast of the nature of its future activities.

2. CONTEMPLATED ACTION OF THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT AGAINST THE CPI

From the standpoint of Italy: The purpose would be to give some indication of the intention of the Scelba Government, which it can or cannot carry out, and therefore to indicate the degree of the Government's strength and determination and its power to implement its policy. The analyst would be interested in evidence bearing on the positions of the various non-communist parties especially the actions of Nenni's PSI and on probable popular reactions to the proposed actions whose nature might be significant. Other specific questions would have to do with the kinds of counteractions by the CP to be expected, the degree of the government's preparation to deal with these counteractions, and the effect on the balance of power of exposing and undermining certain communist segments of the Italian economy.

From the standpoint of communism: Matters of particular interest would be: The staying power of the CPI vis-a-vis government pressure, the nature and vulnerability of CP finances (which might be compared with the finances of other parties), the techniques of the Italian party's communication system with the orbit, i.e. specifically Prague, the probable nature of the party's counter-strategy to minimize the consequences of the government's measures, the reaction of other Western European parties, notably

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

the French, the probable reaction in Moscow, the prospects of the indication of a new "line" or further strengthening of the old one.

3. ADMISSION OF DIEGO RIVERA INTO THE MEXICAN CP

From the standpoint of Mexico: What is mainly interesting is the extent to which this event will itself stir up the somewhat sluggish Mexican party and give it more impetus or is symptomatic of other developments which will have this effect. What is needed, therefore, is a reappraisal of the internal Mexican political power situation.

From the standpoint of Communism: This event is of considerable interest in that it indicates a rapprochement between the Trotskyites and the Stalinists. Rivera is known to have been an admirer of Trotsky, and in spite of his fame has been refused admission to the CP at least two times during the past decade. Sizing up communist trends in other parts of the world, the analyst would find proof that in several countries, both in Europe and Asia, official communist hostility toward Trotskyism has diminished and that, for their part, Trotskyites have made common cause with the CP's. The analyst would interpret this event in theoretical and tactical terms, as well as in the context of the fact that Mexico has become the unofficial headquarters for communism in Latin America and perhaps a communist base for infiltration of the U.S.

4. FRENCH AND GERMAN REACTIONS TOWARD GERMAN REARMAMENT AND RELATED MATTERS

From the standpoint of France and Germany: The significant questions are apparent. First and foremost, what is likely to be the internal political effect on the positions of Mendes-France and Adenauer respectively? Are

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

these momentous recent developments likely to force through a major breakup and regrouping of French political parties? Will Adenauer's concessions for and devotion to the cause of irreversible involvement of Germany in the Western community set in motion a deterioration of his power position and of that of the DC party domestically? Will the German socialists be driven into real neutralism in their insistence on reunification or will they in time accept West German membership in NATO as a fait accompli, thus restoring some degree of unity on foreign affairs in Germany?

From the standpoint of communism: What is mainly of interest, is on the one hand, the strategy and tactics of the communist parties in France, West Germany, and East Germany, and, on the other, the reaction of the high command in the Kremlin to this recent successful progress in the direction of German rearmament. Will the Kremlin make further and more attractive offers of withdrawal from Germany designed to prevent ratification of the London agreements? Assuming ratification, will the Soviet move decisively to tighten the incorporation of East German into the Eastern bloc? What bearing will any such latter moves have on the current worldwide communist strategy of relaxing tensions in order to promote cleavages within the Western coalition?

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~